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Abstract
We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only
within a constant multiplicative factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and the mechanism designer knows δ. The
classical notions of implementation in dominant strategies and implementation in undominated
strategies are naturally extended to this setting, but their power is vastly different.
On the negative side, we prove that no dominant-strategy mechanism can guarantee social
welfare that is significantly better than that achievable by assigning the good to a random
player.
On the positive side, we provide tight upper and lower bounds for the fraction of the max-
imum social welfare achievable in undominated strategies, whether deterministically or proba-
bilistically.
A non-archival draft of the introduction of this paper is presented at
the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS 2012) conference,
with the title Mechanism Design with Approximate Valuations.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to design mechanisms guaranteeing high social welfare in auctions of a
single good whose players are Knightian.
1.1 Knightian Players
In a traditional single-good auction, each player i is assumed to know his true valuation for the
good, θi, exactly. The assumption, however, may be quite strong. For instance, can i be really sure
that his true valuation is exactly $17,975 rather than —say— $18,001? If not, then how can his
uncertainty be modeled?
A classical answer is to assume that i knows the single probability distribution Di from which
his true valuation is drawn. More generally, Knight (1921), and later on Bewley (2002), suggested
to assume that i knows only a set of distributions, one of which is guaranteed to be Di.
In an auction, however, from a strategic perspective a “Knightian player” could collapse each
candidate distribution in his set to its expected value. Accordingly, without loss of generality, in
a Knightian auction each player i only knows a set of integers, Ki, guaranteed to contain his true
valuation θi. Therefore, Ki is “the set of all possible candidates for θi in i’s mind”, and will be
referred to as i’s candidate-valuation set.
1.2 Our Knightian Focus
Knightian players have received much attention in decision theory or in mechanisms with a single
player. We are instead interested in studying the competition of multiple Knightian players in full-
fledged mechanisms. Transforming rich (i.e., exact or Bayesian) knowledge into optimal mechanisms
is important. But equally important is to understand whether there are good mechanisms when
the players only have set-theoretic knowledge about themselves.
Specifically, we focus on Knightian auctions of a single good, adopting for simplicity sake a
finite perspective. Namely,
• all valuations will be integers between 0 and a valuation bound B, and
• all mechanisms specify finitely many pure strategies for each player.
(Our results can however be extended to infinite settings as well.)
1.3 Knightian Mechanism Design
Intuitively, a mechanism cannot perform well in a Knightian setting where the candidate-valuation
sets Ki are too “spread out”, but it might perform well when they are sufficiently “clustered”.
Accordingly, we believe that performance should be measured as a function of the “inaccuracy” of
the players’ knowledge.
Measuring inaccuracy. For a candidate-valuation set Ki of a player i, we set
δi
def
=
maxKi −minKi
maxKi + minKi
.
Then, it is immediately seen that δi ∈ [0, 1] and that, because θi ∈ Ki, “player i knows θi within a
multiplicative factor of δi”.
We refer to δi as i’s individual inaccuracy (about his internal knowledge).
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We define the (global) inaccuracy of a Knightian setting to be δ
def
= maxi δi.
A setting is Knightian if δ > 0 and traditional if δ = 0.
(If c ∈ R and α ∈ [0, 1], then we may call [c − αc, c + αc] a α-interval with center c. Any set
contained in a α-interval will be called α-approximate.)
Designer knowledge. To study auction mechanisms in a Knightian setting we must specify what
information is available to the designer.
In a Bayesian setting, where the true valuation profile is drawn from a common prior distribution
D, it is traditionally assumed thatD itself is known to the designer (and the players). In a Knightian
setting, each player i knows a set of distributions {Di,1, . . . , Di,k}, which, as already observed, is
equivalent to knowing the set of their expected values, Ki. So: how much of this information should
the designer be allowed to know?
An extreme assumption is that he knows every Ki. A much weaker assumption is that he knows
all individual inaccuracies, but not any candidate-valuation set Ki. A yet weaker assumption is
that he knows only the maximum individual inaccuracy. This is the assumption we choose to work
under: namely, when designing an auction mechanism for Knightian setting,
the designer only knows the global inaccuracy parameter δ.
Performance. Being in a tough set-theoretic setting, we adopt a worst-case analysis for evaluating
the social welfare performance of an auction mechanism M . Figurately speaking, we envisage the
following process. First, an auction mechanism M is announced for selling a given good to n
Knightian players, where each player i privately knows his own candidate-valuation set Ki. Then
—aware of K
def
= K1 × · · · × Kn and M , and intending to fool M— the devil secretly chooses a
true-valuation profile θ ∈ K. After that, each player i chooses a strategy σi. (A player i may learn
θi only after the auction is over, or never, but during the auction he acts based only on Ki.) Finally,
M is played with strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) so as to produce a winner w = w(M,σ). Note
that w is in general a random variable, since every σi may be mixed and M may be probabilistic.
The maximum social welfare is of course maxi θi; and the realized social welfare of M on σ is
E[θw(M,σ)]. Informally speaking, the social welfare performance of M relative to K and σ is taken
to be minθ∈K
E[θw(M,σ)]
maxi θi
. (Formally, of course, we must specify the solution concept “behind σ”.)
Objectives. In designing mechanisms in a Knightian setting we study and try to maximize their
performance as a function of the global inaccuracy δ. In essence, δ is our chosen Trojan horse for
bringing meaningful mechanism design in the Knightian setting. Without paying attention to the
quality of the players’ knowledge about themselves, one might design elementary mechanisms, but
not “good” ones.
Q&A.
• Multiplicative or additive accuracy? A greater level of generality is achieved by considering
two distinct global inaccuracy parameters: a multiplicative one, δ∗, and an additive one, δ+,
leading to the following modified constraint: for all player i there exists xi ∈ R such that
Ki ⊆
[
(1− δ∗)xi − δ+, (1 + δ∗)xi + δ+
] ∩ {0, . . . , B}.
All of our theorems hold for this more general condition. For simplicity, however, we con-
sider only one kind of global inaccuracy parameter, and we find the multiplicative one more
meaningful.
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• Can real δ’s be really large? Absolutely. The players’ candidate-valuation sets may indeed
be “very approximate”. Consider a firm participating to an auction for an exclusive license
to manufacture solar panels in the US for a period of 25 years. Even if the demand were
precisely known in advance, and the only uncertainty came from the firm’s ability to lower
its costs of production via some breakthrough research, a firm’s individual inaccuracy about
its own true valuation for the license could easily exceed 0.5.
1.4 Solution Concepts
The analysis of every mechanism requires an underlying solution concept. As Knightian settings
are settings of incomplete information (i.e., settings whose players do not know exactly the true
valuations of their opponents), two solution concepts naturally apply: implementation in dominant
strategies and implementation in undominated strategies. Of course, both solution concepts need to
be properly extended to our setting, but this is naturally done (and in fact done in a way consistent
with all prior works).
In essence, a pure strategy si of a player i is (very weakly) Knightian-dominant if it provides i
with a utility at least as large as that of any other strategy ti of i, no matter what strategies his
opponents may choose, and no matter what candidate in Ki may be i’s true valuation. A pure
strategy si of i is Knightian-undominated if i does not have any other strategy ti that
(1) gives i utility at least as great as si no matter what strategy subprofiles his opponents may
use, and no matter what member of Ki may be i’s true valuation, and
(2) gives i utility strictly greater than si for at least some strategy subprofile of his opponents
and some member of Ki.
(The set of such undominated strategies under a mechanism M is denoted by UDedMi (Ki), or
simply by UDedi(Ki) when M is clear from context.)
1.5 Informal Discussion of Our Results
How much social welfare can we guarantee in auctions? In traditional ones the answer is trivial:
100% in (very-weakly) dominant strategies, via the second-price mechanism. Things are quite
different in Knightian auctions.
1.5.1 Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms Are Meaningful but Inadequate
Although a Knightian player “does not have a best valuation to bid”, very-weakly-dominant strate-
gies continue to be meaningfully defined in a Knightian auction. In a traditional auction the revela-
tion principle (see Myerson (1981)) guarantees that, as far as very-weakly-dominant strategies are
concerned, it suffices to consider mechanisms that restrict a player’s strategies to (reporting) single
valuations. It is easy to see, however, that a natural exentension of the revelation principle contin-
ues to apply in Knightian auctions. Specifically, if a very-weakly-dominant strategy mechanism M
with a given social welfare performance guarantee exists, then there also exists a Knightian-direct
mechanism M ′, with the same performance, where, for every player i, (1) his pure strategy set
consists of reporting sets of valuations, and (2) truthfully reporting his own candidate-valuation
set Ki is very-weakly dominant.
In principle, therefore, there may be a dominant-strategy mechanism that obtains all true
candidate-valuation sets, K1, . . . ,Kn, and guarantees a high social welfare performance. Of course,
given the inaccuracy of the players’ knowledge of their own true valuations, one should expect some
degradation of performance relative to the exact-valuation setting. However, one might conjecture
that, in a Knightian auction with global inaccuracy δ, a dominant-strategy mechanism might be
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able to guarantee some δ-dependent fraction —such as (1−δ), (1−3δ), or (1−δ)2— of the maximum
social welfare. We prove, however, that even such modest hopes are overly optimistic.
Theorem 1 (informal). For all n ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B > 3−δ2δ , no (possibly probabilistic)
very-weakly-dominant-strategy-truthful mechanism Mn,δ,B can guarantee a fraction of the maximum
social welfare greater than
1
n
+
b3−δ2δ c+ 1
B
in any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ.
As a relative measure of the quality of the players’ self knowledge, δ should be independent of
the magnitude of the players’ valuations. But to ensure an upper bound on the players’ valuations,
B should be large. Accordingly, the above result essentially implies that any very-weakly-dominant-
strategy mechanism can only guarantee a fraction ≈ 1n of the maximum social welfare. However,
such a fraction can be trivially achieved by the “naive” very-weakly-dominant-strategy mechanism
that, dispensing with all bids, assigns the good to a random player! Thus, Theorem 1 essentially
says that no dominant-strategy mechanism can be smart: “the optimal one can only be as good as
good as the stupid naive one”. In other words,
dominant strategies are intrinsically linked to each player having exact knowledge of
either (1) his own valuation, or (2) the unique possible distribution from which his own
valuation has been drawn.
By showing the limitations of dominant strategies in Knightian auctions, Theorem 1 opens the door
to alternative solution concepts: in particular, to implementation in undominated strategies. We
actually believe that the Knightian setting will provide a new and vital role for this natural and
non-Bayesian implementation notion.
1.5.2 The Power of Deterministic Undominated-Strategy Mechanisms
We tightly characterize the power of implementation in undominated strategies via deterministic
mechanisms in Knightian auctions. First of all, without much difficulty, we show that the second-
price mechanism (although no longer dominant-strategy) guarantees a relatively good fraction of
the maximum social welfare in undominated strategies, despite the fact that it does not leverage
any information about δ. Second, more importantly and perhaps more surprisingly, we prove that
no deterministic undominated-strategy mechanism can do better, even with full knowledge of δ.
The (good) performance of the second-price mechanism.
Theorem 2 (informal). In any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccu-
racy parameter δ, the second-price mechanism guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare
that is
≈
(
1−δ
1+δ
)2
.1
The course intuition behind Theorem 2 is clear:
1We note that when breaking ties at random, the performance of the second-price mechanism is only marginally
better: namely, it guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare exactly equal to ( 1−δ
1+δ
)2.
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“It is obvious that each player i should only consider bidding a value vi inside his own
candidate-valuation set Ki. It is further obvious that the worst possible gap between the
maximum and the actual social welfare is achieved in the following case. Let w be the
winner in the second-price mechanism, and let h, h 6= w, be the player with the largest
candidate valuation. Player w bids vw = maxKw, and player h bids vh = minKh (and
vw only slightly exceeds vh). In this case it is obvious that the second-price mechanism
guarantees at most a fraction ≈ (1−δ1+δ)2 of the maximum social welfare. ”
Of course, things are a bit more complex. In particular, the fact that a player i should only consider
bids in Ki (actually more precisely between minKi − 1 and maxKi + 1) requires a proof.
The optimality of the second-price mechanism.
Theorem 3 (informal). For all n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B ≥ 5δ , no deterministic undominated-
strategy mechanism Mn,B,δ can guarantee a fraction of the maximum social welfare greater than(
1− δ
1 + δ
)2
+
4
B
in any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ.
Theorem 3 is harder to prove, as is to be expected from an impossibility result. Indeed, its
statement applies to all undominated-strategy mechanisms, so that the revelation principle is no
longer relevant. Thus, to prove Theorem 3, rather than analyzing a single mechanism (the “direct
truthful” one), in principle we should consider all possible mechanisms. Considering only those
where a player’s strategies consist of valuations, or even sets of valuations, is not sufficient. We
would have to consider mechanisms with arbitrary strategy sets. Establishing Theorem 3 thus
requires new techniques, informally discussed in Section 1.6, and formally provided in Section 6.
1.5.3 The Greater Power of Probabilistic Undominated-Strategy Mechanisms
The second-price mechanism “ignores the global inaccuracy parameter”. It simply guarantees a
fraction ≈ (1−δ1+δ )2 of the maximum social welfare in any Knightian auction, no matter what the
value of δ happens to be. It is thus legitimate to ask whether knowing δ (or a close upper-bound
to it) enables one to design mechanisms with better efficiency guarantees. We prove that this is
indeed the case: we explicitly construct a probabilistic mechanism that, by properly leveraging
δ, outperforms the second-price mechanism, and then we prove that our mechanism is essentially
optimal.
Theorem 4 (informal). For all n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B, there exists a mechanism M (δ)opt that
guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare that is at least
(1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
in any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ.
Theoretical significance. Theorem 4 highlights a novelty of the Knightian setting: namely,
probabilism enhances the power of implementation in undominated strategies even for guaran-
teeing social welfare. By contrast, probabilism offers no such advantage in the exact-valuation
world, since the deterministic second-price mechanism already guarantees maximum social welfare.
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We conjecture that, in Knightian settings, probabilistic mechanisms will enjoy a provably better
performance in other applications as well.
Practicality. The proof of Theorem 4 is the technically hardest one in this paper. Nonetheless, we
would like to emphasize that M
(δ)
opt is very practically played, as it requires almost no computation
from the players, and a very small amount of computation from the mechanism. In addition, its
performance is practically preferable to that of the second-price mechanism. For instance, when
δ = 0.5, M
(δ)
opt guarantees a social welfare that is at least five times higher than that of the second-
price mechanism when there are 2 players, and at least three times higher when there are 4 players.
(For a full comparison chart, see Appendix A.)
If M
(δ)
opt proves the power of probabilistic mechanisms, our next theorem upperbounds this power
by proving that the social-welfare performance of M
(δ)
opt is essentially optimal among all mechanisms,
probabilistic or not.
Theorem 5 (informal). For all n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B ≥ 5δ , no (possibly probabilistic) undominated-
strategy mechanism Mn,δ,B can guarantee a fraction of the maximum social welfare greater than
(1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
+
4
B
in any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ.
In sum, our results prove that mechanism design in the Knightian setting is quite possible.
Some of the old techniques no longer work, but it is still possible to construct good mechanisms.
1.6 Two Techniques of Independent Interest
New ventures require new tools. Let us thus highlight two techniques, crucial to our present
endeavor, that we believe will prove useful also to future work in Knightian mechanism design.
The Undominated Intersection Lemma. To prove Theorem 3 and Theorem 5, we establish
a basic structural relation between candidate-valuation sets and undominated strategies. The
simplest one of course would be UDedi(Ki) = Ki. This relation, however, is generally false, even
when the strategies available to each player consist of individual valuations between 0 and B.2 A
second relation, implied by the previous one, is the following:
∀ Ki and K˜i, Ki ∩ K˜i 6= ∅ ⇒ UDedi(Ki) ∩ UDedi(K˜i) 6= ∅.
It is not clear, however, whether this second relation always holds.3 Indeed, an undominated-
strategy mechanism may have to specify its strategy sets in quite unforseen ways. Therefore, as
soon as Ki and K˜i are even slightly different, their corresponding UDedi(Ki) and UDedi(K˜i) may
in principle be totally unrelated. We prove, however, that the following simple variation of the
second relation holds for any possible mechanism. Informally,
2Indeed a mechanism does not need to interpret a bid vi reported by i as i’s true valuation θi. For instance, the
mechanism could first replace each vi by pi(vi) where pi is some fixed permutation over {0, 1, . . . , B} and then run the
second-price mechanism as if each player i had bid pi(vi). In this case, after UDed(Ki) has been correctly computed,
it will look very different from Ki.
3It would actually hold if the total number of coins usable by the players for choosing their mixed strategies were
upper-bounded by a fixed constant.
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For any mechanism, probabilistic or not, if Ki and K˜i have at least two values in common,
then there exist two (possibly mixed) “almost payoff-equivalent” strategies σi and σ˜i respec-
tively having UDedi(Ki) and UDedi(K˜i) as their support.
This relation actually suffices for deriving all our impossibility results.
The Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma. To prove that a given social choice function can
be implemented in undominated strategies we are happy to consider mechanisms using a restricted
kind of strategies and allocation functions, but we must achieve a delicate balance. On one hand,
these restrictions should ensure that the undominated strategies corresponding to a given candidate-
valuation set can be characterized in a way that is both conceptually simple and easy to work with.
On the other hand, they should be sufficient for proving our Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
Specifically, we consider mechanisms whose strategies consist of individual valuations (i.e., the
pure strategies of each player coincide with {0, . . . , B}) and whose allocation functions are re-
strictions (to {0, . . . , B}n) of integrable functions (over [0, B]n) satisfying a suitable monotonicity
property. A simple lemma, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma, then guarantees that, for all
candidate-valuation set Ki,
UDedi(Ki) = {minKi,maxKi}.
Although concerned with undominated strategies, when applied to the case of players knowing
their valuations exactly, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma is a strengthening of a classical
lemma characterizing (very weakly) dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms in traditional single-
good auctions. Further, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma actually applies to all single-
parameter domains, not just single-good auctions (the same way that the classical lemma does).
We thus believe that this simple lemma will be useful beyond the immediate needs of this paper.
2 Prior Work with Knightian Players
As already mentioned, Knightian players have received a lot of attention in decision theory. In
particular, Aumann (1962), Dubra et al. (2004), Ok (2002) and Nascimento (2011) investigate
decision with incomplete orders of preferences.
The merits of different ways for a Knightian player to “condense” his set of possible values into
a meaningfully and deterministically-chosen single value have been explored. For example, Danan
(2010) studies the average, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) the maximum, and Schmeidler (1989)
the Choquet expectation.
Other authors have studied mechanisms where a single Knightian player is called to accept or
reject a given offer; in particular Lopomo et al. (2009) studied the rent-extraction problem in such
a setting.
Less relevant to our work, several authors have considered individual Bayesians to model a
player’s uncertainty: for instance, Sandholm (2000), Porter et al. (2008), and Feige and Tennenholtz
(2011). Also, others have studied equilibrium models with unordered preferences: for instance Mas-
Colell (1974), Gale and Mas-Colell (1975), Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975), and Fon and Otani
(1979). More recently, Rigotti and Shannon (2005) have characterized the set of equilibria in a
financial market problem.
3 Single-Good Knightian Auctions
We separate every auction into two parts, a context and a mechanism.
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Knightian Contexts. A Knightian context C has the following components.4
• [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, the set of players.
• {0, 1, . . . , B}, the set of all valuations, where B is the valuation bound.
• δ ∈ (0, 1], the inaccuracy of the context.
• K, the profile of candidate-valuation sets, where, for all i, Ki ⊆ δ[xi] for some xi ∈ R. Here,
δ[x]
def
= [(1− δ)x, (1 + δ)x] ∩ {0, 1, . . . , B}.
• θ, the profile of true valuations, where each θi ∈ Ki.
• Ω = {0, 1, . . . , n} ×Rn, the set of outcomes. If (a, P ) ∈ Ω, then we refer to a as an allocation
and to P as a profile of prices. (If a = 0 then the good remains unallocated, else player a
wins the good.)
• u, the profile of utility functions. Each ui maps any outcome (a, P ) to θi−Pi if a = i, and to
−Pi otherwise.
Notice that C is fully specified by n,B, δ,K, and θ, that is, C = (n,B, δ,K, θ).
Knowledge. In a context C = (n,B, δ,K, θ) each player i only knows Ki and that θi ∈ Ki, and
a mechanism designer only knows n, B, and δ.
Notation. The set of all contexts with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy δ, is denoted
by Cn,B,δ.
The social welfare of an outcome (a, P ) relative to true-valuation profile θ, SW(θ, (a, P )), is
defined to be θa. The maximum social welfare of a true-valuation profile θ, MSW(θ), is defined to
be maxi∈[n] θi.
Mechanisms. Our mechanisms for Knightian contexts are finite and ordinary. Indeed a mecha-
nism for Cn,B,δ is a pair M = (S, F ) where
• S = S1 × · · · × Sn is the set of all pure strategy profiles of M , and
• F : S → {0, 1, . . . , n} × Rn is M ’s outcome function.
Set S is always finite and non-empty, and function F may be probabilistic.
Notation.
• We denote pure strategies by Latin letters, and possibly mixed strategies by Greek ones.
• If M = (S, F ) is a mechanism and s ∈ S, then by FAi (s) and FPi (s) we respectively denote
the probability that the good is assigned to player i and the expected price paid by i under
strategy profile s. For mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(S), we define FAi (σ) def= Es←σ
[
FAi (s)
]
and FPi (σ)
def
= Es←σ
[
FPi (s)
]
, where s← σ denotes that “s is drawn from the mixed strategy
σ”.
• We refer to FA as the allocation function of M . More generally, we say that f : S → [0, 1]n
is an allocation function if for all strategy profile s ∈ S, ∑i∈[n] fi(s) ≤ 1.
4 Knightian Dominance
In extending the three classical notions of dominance to our approximate valuation setting, the
obvious constraint is that when each candidate-valuation set Ki consists of a single element, then
all extended notions must collapse to the original ones.
Definition 4.1. In a mechanism M = (S, F ) for Cn,B,δ, let K be a profile of candidate-valuation
sets, i a player, σi a (possibly mixed) strategy of i, and si a pure strategy of i. Then, relatively to
Ki, we say that
4The players’ beliefs are not part of our contexts because they cannot affect our strong solution concept.
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• σi very-weakly dominates si, in symbols σi
vw
i,Ki
si, if
∀ θi ∈ Ki , ∀ t−i ∈ S−i : Eui(θi, F (σi, t−i)) ≥ Eui(θi, F (si, t−i)) .
• σi weakly dominates si, in symbols σi
w
i,Ki
si, if (a) σi
vw
i,Ki
si and
(b) ∃ θi ∈ Ki , ∃ t−i ∈ S−i : Eui(θi, F (σi, t−i)) > Eui(θi, F (si, t−i)) .
The (very-weakly-)dominant strategies for Ki and K respectively are
Dnti(Ki)
def
=
{
si ∈ Si : ∀ ti ∈ Si , si
vw
i,Ki
ti
}
and Dnt(K)
def
= Dnt1(K1)× · · · × Dntn(Kn) .
The undominated strategies for Ki and K respectively are
UDedi(Ki)
def
=
{
si ∈ Si :6 ∃σi ∈ ∆(Si) , σi
w
i,Ki
si
}
and UDed(K)
def
= UDed1(K1)× · · · × UDedn(Kn).
We use the notation Dnti instead of, say, “VWDnti” because we have no need to define weakly-
dominant or strictly-dominant strategies in a Knightian setting. (Indeed, Theorem 1 shows that
even very-weakly-dominant strategies cannot guarantee any non-trivial performance.)
We use the notation UDedi instead of, say, “UWDedi”, because (as in the classical setting)
implementation in undominated strategies is defined for weak dominance.5
The above extensions of the classical notions are quite straightforward. Only to the extension
of weak dominance might require some attention.6
Finally, let us note that the following obviously holds.
Fact 4.2. UDedi(Ki) 6= ∅ for all Ki.
5 Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. For all n ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1), B > 3−δ2δ , and all (possibly probabilistic) very-weakly-
dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms M = (S, F ) for Cn,B,δ, there exists a context (n,B, δ,K, θ) ∈
Cn,B,δ such that
E
[
SW
(
θ, F (K)
)] ≤ ( 1
n
+
b3−δ2δ c+ 1
B
)
MSW(θ) .
Proof. Fix arbitrarily n, δ, and B such that B > 3−δ2δ . We start by proving a separate claim.
Essentially, as soon as a player reports a δ-interval whose center is sufficiently high, his winning
probability remains constant. (Actually the same holds for his price, although we do not care about
it.)
Claim 5.1. For all players i, all integers x ∈ (3−δ2δ , B], and all subprofiles K˜−i of δ-approximate
candidate-valuation sets,
5Also, when considering instead very-weak dominance, two “equivalent” strategies may eliminate each other and
the set UDed may become empty.
6 Consider defining “σi weakly dominates si” using the following alternative quantifications in the additional
condition for weak dominance: (1) ∀θi∀t−i, (2) ∃θi∀t−i, and (3) ∀θi∃t−i. Alternatives 1 and 2 do not yield the
classical notion of weak dominance when Ki is singleton. Alternative 3 fails to capture the “weakest condition” for
which, in absence of special beliefs, a strategy si should be discarded in favor of σi. Indeed, since we already know
that σi very-weakly dominates si, for player i to discard strategy si in favor of σi, it should suffice that si is strictly
worse than σi for a single true-valuation candidate θi ∈ Ki. That is, we should not insist that si be strictly worse
than σi for all θi ∈ Ki.
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FAi (δ[x], K˜−i) = F
A
i (δ[x+ 1], K˜−i).
Proof of Claim 5.1. Because Ki may coincide with δ[x], and because when this is the case reporting
δ[x] very-weakly dominates reporting δ[x+ 1], the following inequality must hold: ∀ θi ∈ δ[x],
FAi (δ[x], K˜−i) · θi − FPi (δ[x], K˜−i) ≥ FAi (δ[x+ 1], K˜−i) · θi − FPi (δ[x+ 1], K˜−i) (5.1)
Because Ki may coincide with δ[x + 1], and because when this is the case reporting δ[x + 1]
very-weakly dominates reporting δ[x], the following inequality also holds: ∀ θ′i ∈ δ[x+ 1],
FAi (δ[x+ 1], K˜−i) · θ′i − FPi (δ[x+ 1], K˜−i) ≥ FAi (δ[x], K˜−i) · θ′i − FPi (δ[x], K˜−i) . (5.2)
Thus, setting θi = x in Eq. 5.1 and θ
′
i = x + 1 in Eq. 5.2, and summing up (the corresponding
terms of) the resulting inequalities, the FPi price terms and a few other terms cancel out yielding
the following inequality:
FAi (δ[x+ 1], K˜−i) ≥ FAi (δ[x], K˜−i) . (5.3)
Also, setting θi = bx(1 + δ)c in Eq. 5.1 and θ′i = d(x+ 1)(1− δ)e in Eq. 5.2,7 and summing up the
resulting inequalities we obtain the following one:(
FAi (δ[x], K˜−i)− FAi (δ[x+ 1], K˜−i)
)
·
(
bx(1 + δ)c − d(x+ 1)(1− δ)e
)
≥ 0 . (5.4)
Now notice that bx(1 + δ)c − d(x + 1)(1 − δ)e > 0, because, by hypothesis, x > 3−δ2δ . Thus from
Eq. 5.4 we deduce
FAi (δ[x], K˜−i) ≥ FAi (δ[x+ 1], K˜−i) (5.5)
Together, Eq. 5.3 and Eq. 5.5 imply our claim.
Let us now finish the proof of Theorem 1. Choose the profile of candidate-valuation sets
K̂
def
= (δ[c], δ[c], . . . , δ[c]), where c
def
= b3−δ2δ c + 1. By averaging, because the summation of FAi (K̂)
over i ∈ [n] cannot be greater than 1, there must exist a player j such that FAj (K̂) ≤ 1/n. Without
loss of generality, let such player be player 1. Then, invoking Claim 5.1 multiple times we have
FA1 (δ[B], δ[c], . . . , δ[c]) = F
A
1 (δ[B − 1], δ[c], . . . , δ[c]) = · · · = FA1 (δ[c], δ[c], . . . , δ[c]) = FA1 (K̂) ≤
1
n
.
Now suppose that the true candidate-valuation profile of the players is K
def
= (δ[B], δ[c], . . . , δ[c]).
Then, θ = (B, c, . . . , c) ∈ K and
E
[
SW
(
θ, F (K)
)] ≤ 1
n
B +
n− 1
n
c ≤
(
1
n
+
c
B
)
B =
(
1
n
+
c
B
)
·MSW(θ) ,
as desired. 
7The hypothesis x > 3−δ
2δ
implies that x > 1
2δ
, which in turn implies that, under the above choices, θi ∈ δ[x] and
θ′i ∈ δ[x+ 1].
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6 The Undominated Intersection Lemma
Lemma 6.1 (Undominated Intersection Lemma). Let M = (S, F ) be a mechanism, i a player,
and Ki and K˜i two candidate-valuation sets of i such that |Ki ∩ K˜i| > 1. Then, for every ε > 0,
there exist mixed strategies σi ∈ ∆(UDedi(Ki)) and σ˜i ∈ ∆(UDedi(K˜i)) such that ∀ s−i ∈ S−i,∣∣FAi (σi, s−i)− FAi (σ˜i, s−i)∣∣ < ε .
(Actually the same holds for FP , although we do not care about it.)
Proof. Let xi and yi be two distinct integers in Ki ∩ K˜i, and, without loss of generality, let xi > yi.
Recall that, by Fact 4.2, UDedi(Ki) and UDedi(K˜i) are both nonempty. If there exists a
common (pure) strategy si ∈ UDedi(Ki) ∩ UDedi(K˜i), then setting σi = σ˜i = si completes the
proof. Therefore, let us assume that UDedi(Ki) and UDedi(K˜i) are disjoint, and let si be a strategy
in UDedi(Ki) but not in UDedi(K˜i). The finiteness of the strategy set Si implies the existence of a
strategy σ˜i ∈ ∆(UDedi(K˜i)) such that σ˜i
w
i,K˜i
si.
8 We now prove that
∃ τi ∈ ∆(UDedi(Ki)) such that τi
w
i,Ki
σ˜i.
9
Let σ˜i =
∑
j∈X α
(j)s˜
(j)
i , where X is a subset of Si. Invoking again the disjointness of the two un-
dominated strategy sets, we deduce that for each j ∈ X there exists a strategy τ (j)i ∈ ∆(UDedi(Ki))
such that τ
(j)
i
w
i,Ki
s˜
(j)
i . Then it is easily seen that τi
def
=
∑
j∈X α
(j)τ
(j)
i is a mixed strategy as desired.
For the same reason, we can also find some τ˜i ∈ ∆(UDedi(K˜i)) such that τ˜i
w
i,K˜i
τi. Continuing
in this fashion, “jumping” back and forth between ∆(UDedi(Ki)) and ∆(UDedi(K˜i)), we obtain
an infinite chain of not necessarily distinct strategies, {σ(k)i , σ˜(k)i }k∈N (where (σ(1)i = si, σ˜(1)i = σi,
and) such that
σ
(1)
i
w≺
i,Ki
σ˜
(1)
i
w≺
i,K˜i
σ
(2)
i
w≺
i,Ki
σ˜
(2)
i
w≺
i,K˜i
· · ·
Since weak dominance implies very-weak dominance, we have that for all s−i ∈ S−i and all k ∈ N:
∀θ˜i ∈ K˜i, FAi (σ(k)i , s−i)θ˜i − FPi (σ(k)i , s−i) ≤ FAi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)θ˜i − FPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)
∀θi ∈ Ki, FAi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)θi − FPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i) ≤ FAi (σ(k+1)i , s−i)θi − FPi (σ(k+1)i , s−i)
Thus, for any zi ∈ Ki ∩ K˜i, setting θi = θ˜i = zi we see that, for all s−i ∈ S−i and for k = 1, 2, . . .
FAi (σ
(k)
i , s−i)zi − FPi (σ(k)i , s−i)
≤ FAi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)zi − FPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)
≤ FAi (σ(k+1)i , s−i)zi − FPi (σ(k+1)i , s−i) .
That is, we have an infinite and non-decreasing sequence that is bounded from above. (Indeed,
zi ≤ B, FAi ranges between 0 and 1, and each price is non-negative.) Thus, since xi, yi ∈ Ki ∩ K˜i,
for any ε′ > 0 there exists a (sufficiently large) k such that∣∣∣FAi (σ(k)i , s−i)xi − FPi (σ(k)i , s−i)− (FAi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)xi − FPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i))∣∣∣ < ε′
8When Si is not finite, we need of course to assume that the mechanism is bounded; see Jackson (1992).
9Note that, while we have only defined what it means for a pure strategy to be dominated by a possibly mixed
one, the definition trivially extends to the case of dominated strategies that are mixed, as for “τi
w
i,Ki
σ˜i” in the case
at hand.
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and ∣∣∣FAi (σ(k)i , s−i)yi − FPi (σ(k)i , s−i)− (FAi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)yi − FPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i))∣∣∣ < ε′
Now consider the following two linear functions:
g(z)
def
= FAi (σ
(k)
i , s−i)z − FPi (σ(k)i , s−i) and h(z) def= FAi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)z − FPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i) .
We have showed that |g(xi)− h(xi)| < ε′ and |g(yi)− h(yi)| < ε′. We now use the fact that if two
linear functions are close at two points, they must have similar slopes. In particular,
|slope(g)− slope(h)| =
∣∣∣∣g(xi)− g(yi)xi − yi − h(xi)− h(yi)xi − yi
∣∣∣∣
≤ |g(xi)− h(xi)|+ |g(yi)− h(yi)||xi − yi| <
2ε′
|xi − yi| .
The proof is complete by taking ε′ = ε|xi − yi|/2. 
7 Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. For all n ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1), B ≥ 5δ , and all deterministic mechanisms M = (S, F ) for
Cn,B,δ, there exist a context (n,B, δ,K, θ) ∈ Cn,B,δ and a strategy profile s ∈ UDed(K) such that:
SW
(
θ, F (s)
) ≤ ((1− δ
1 + δ
)2
+
4
B
)
MSW(θ) .
Proof. Choose x and y such that b(1 + δ)xc = B and y def= b (1−δ)x+21+δ c. Since B > 5δ , d(1 − δ)ye
belongs to {0, 1, . . . , B}. Furthermore, recalling that δ[x] def= [(1− δ)x, (1 + δ)x]∩ {0, 1, . . . , B}, one
can verify that δ[x] and δ[y] both contain the two integers dx(1− δ)e and dx(1− δ)e+ 1.
Choose ε such that 1n + ε < 1. Then (the Undominated Intersection) Lemma 6.1 guarantees
that
∀i ∈ [n] ∃σi ∈ ∆(UDedi(δ[x])) and σ′i ∈ ∆(UDedi(δ[y])) such that ∀s−i ∈ S−i : (7.1)∣∣FAi (σi, s−i)− FAi (σ′i, s−i)∣∣ < ε .
Now consider the allocation distribution FA(σ′1, . . . , σ′n), where the randomness comes from the
mixed strategy profile since M is a deterministic mechanism. Since the good will be assigned with
a total probability mass of 1, by averaging, there exists a player j such that FAj (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
n) ≤ 1n :
that is, player j wins the good with probability at most 1n . Without loss of generality, let j = 1.
In particular, there exist s′−1 ∈ UDed2(δ[y])× · · · × UDedn(δ[y]), such that FA1 (σ′1, s′−1) ≤ 1n . This
together with Eq. 7.1 implies that FA1 (σ1, s
′−1) ≤ 1n + ε < 1. In turn, this implies that there exists
a pure strategy s1 ∈ UDed1(δ[x]) such that, setting s def= (s1, s′−1), FA1 (s) = 0.
Now we construct the desired δ-approximate candidate-valuation profileK and the true-valuation
profile θ as follows:
K
def
=
(
δ[x], δ[y], . . . , δ[y]
)
and θ
def
=
(b(1 + δ)xc, d(1− δ)ye, . . . , d(1− δ)ye) .
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Note that s ∈ UDed(K), θ ∈ K, and MSW(θ) = b(1 + δ)xc. Since FA1 (s) = 0,
SW
(
θ, F (s)
)
= d(1− δ)ye ≤ (1− δ)y + 1
≤ (1− δ)
2x
1 + δ
+ 3 =
(1− δ)2
(1 + δ)2
(1 + δ)x+ 3
≤ (1− δ)
2
(1 + δ)2
b(1 + δ)xc+ 4 ≤ (1− δ)
2
(1 + δ)2
b(1 + δ)xc+ 4
B
b(1 + δ)xc
≤
(
(1− δ)2
(1 + δ)2
+
4
B
)
b(1 + δ)xc =
(
(1− δ)2
(1 + δ)2
+
4
B
)
MSW(θ) .
Thus the theorem holds. 
8 Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. For all n ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1), B ≥ 5δ , and all (deterministic or probabilistic) mechanisms
M = (S, F ) for Cn,B,δ, there exist a context (n,B, δ,K, θ) ∈ Cn,B,δ and a strategy profile s ∈
UDed(K) such that
E
[
SW
(
θ, F (s)
)] ≤ ((1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
+
4
B
)
MSW(θ) . (8.1)
Proof. (The first part of the proof closely tracks that of Theorem 3 in Appendix 7.10)
Choose x and y such that b(1 + δ)xc = B and y def= b (1−δ)x+21+δ c. Then again d(1− δ)ye belongs
to {0, 1, . . . , B} and δ[x] and δ[y] both contain the following two integer points: dx(1 − δ)e and
dx(1− δ)e+ 1.
Since we always have d(1− δ)ye < (1− δ)y + 1, we can choose ε ∈ (0, 1− 1n) such that
n− 1
n
d(1− δ)ye+ εd(1− δ)xe − εd(1− δ)ye < n− 1
n
(1− δ)y + 1 .
Then (the Undominated Intersection) Lemma 6.1 guarantees that
∀i ∈ [n] there exist σi ∈ ∆(UDedi(δ[x])) and σ′i ∈ ∆(UDedi(δ[y])) such that ∀s−i ∈ S−i : (8.2)∣∣FAi (σi, s−i)− FAi (σ′i, s−i)∣∣ < ε .
Again consider the allocation distribution FA(σ′1, . . . , σ′n). By averaging, there exists some
player j such that FAj (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
n) ≤ 1n . Thus, by our choice of ε and Eq. 8.2, we have that
FA1 (σ1, σ
′−1) ≤ 1n + ε. This implies that there exists a pure strategy profile s = (s1, s′−1) that is in
the support of (σ1, σ
′−1) —and thus in UDed1(δ[x])× UDed2(δ[y])× · · · × UDed2(δ[y])— such that
FA1 (s1, s
′−1) ≤ 1n + ε. Now define
K
def
=
(
δ[x], δ[y], . . . , δ[y]
)
and θ
def
=
(b(1 + δ)xc, d(1− δ)ye, . . . , d(1− δ)ye) .
10Very informally, the only differences are that the allocation distribution FA(σ′1, . . . , σ
′
n) now depends also on the
“coin tosses of the mechanism”, and that one can no longer guarantee the existence of a pure strategy s such that
FA1 (s) = 0.
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Notice that s ∈ UDed(K), θ ∈ K, and MSW(θ) = b(1 + δ)xc. We now show that s, K, and θ
satisfy the desired Eq. 8.1:
E
[
SW
(
θ, F (s1, s
′
−1)
)] ≤ ( 1
n
+ ε
)
· b(1 + δ)xc+
(
n− 1
n
− ε
)
· d(1− δ)ye
=
1
n
· b(1 + δ)xc+ n− 1
n
· d(1− δ)ye+ εd(1− δ)xe − εd(1− δ)ye
<
1
n
· b(1 + δ)xc+ n− 1
n
· (1− δ)y + 1
≤ 1
n
· b(1 + δ)xc+ n− 1
n
· (1− δ)
2x
1 + δ
+ 3
<
1
n
· b(1 + δ)xc+ n− 1
n
· (1− δ)
2
(1 + δ)2
b(1 + δ)xc+ 4
<
(
1
n
+
n− 1
n
· (1− δ)
2
(1 + δ)2
+
4
B
)
b(1 + δ)xc
=
(
1
n
+
n− 1
n
· (1− δ)
2
(1 + δ)2
+
4
B
)
MSW(θ)
=
(
(1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
+
4
B
)
MSW(θ) .

9 The Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma
Let us recall a traditional way to define auction mechanisms from suitable allocation functions.
Definition 9.1. If f : [0, B]n → [0, 1]n is an integrable11 allocation function, then we denote by
Mf the mechanism (S, F ) where S = {0, 1, . . . , B}n and F is so defined: on input bid profile v ∈ S,
• with probability fi(v) the good is assigned to player i, and
• if player i wins, he pays Pi = vi −
∫ vi
0 fi(z,v−i) dz
fi(vi,v−i) (and all other players pay Pj = 0 for j 6= i.)
Remark 9.2.
• Mf is deterministic if and only if f({0, 1, . . . , B}n) ⊆ {0, 1}n.
• For all player i and bid profile v, the expected price FPi (v) is equal to vi · fi(vi, v−i) −∫ vi
0 fi(z, v−i) dz.
• We stress that Mf continues to have the discrete strategy space S = {0, 1, . . . , B}n. The
analysis over a continuous domain for f is only a tool for proving the lemma.
• In the exact-valuation world, it is well known that a single-good auction mechanism M is
very-weakly dominant-strategy-truthful if and only if M = Mf for some function f that is
(integrable and) monotonic, that is, such that each fi is non-decreasing in the bid of player i
for any fixed choice of bids of all other players.
We now slightly strengthen the notion of monotonicity.
Definition 9.3. Let f : [0, B]n → [0, 1]n be a allocation function. For d ∈ {1, 2}, we say that f
is d-distinguishably monotonic (d-DM, for short) if f is integrable, monotonic, and satisfying
11Specifically, we require that, for each v−i, the function fi(z, v−i) is integrable with respect to z on [0, B].
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the following “distinguishability” condition:
∀ i ∈ [n] , ∀vi, v′i ∈ Si s.t. vi ≤ v′i − d, ∃ v−i ∈ S−i
∫ v′i
vi
(
fi(z, v−i)− fi(vi, v−i)
)
dz > 0 .
If f is d-DM, we say that Mf is d-DM.
Distinguishability is certainly an additional requirement to monotonicity, but actually is a mild
one. (Indeed, the second-price mechanism is 2-DM and, if ties are broken at random, even 1-DM.12)
Yet, in our Knightian setting, this mild additional requirement is quite useful for “controlling” the
undominated strategies of a mechanism, and thus for engineering implementations of desirable social
choice functions in undominated strategies.
Lemma 9.4 (Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma). If f is a d-DM allocation function,
then Mf is such that, for any player i and δ-approximate candidate-valuation profile K,
UDedi(Ki) ⊆ {minKi, . . . ,maxKi} if d = 1, and
UDedi(Ki) ⊆ {minKi − 1, . . . ,maxKi + 1} if d = 2.
(Above, minKi and maxKi respectively denote the minimum and maximum integers in Ki.)
Proof. For every i ∈ [n], let v⊥i def= minKi and v>i def= maxKi. Then, to establish our lemma it
suffices to prove that, ∀i ∈ [n] and ∀d ∈ {1, 2}, the following four properties hold:
1. v⊥i very-weakly dominates every vi ≤ v⊥i − d.
2. v>i very-weakly dominates every vi ≥ v>i + d.
3. There is a strategy sub-profile v−i for which v⊥i is strictly better than every vi ≤ v⊥i − d.
4. There is a strategy sub-profile v−i for which v>i is strictly better than every vi ≥ v>i + d.
Proof of Property 1. Fix any (pure) strategy sub-profile v−i ∈ S−i for the other players and any
possible true valuation θi ∈ Ki. Letting v⊥ = (v⊥i , v−i) and v = (vi, v−i), we prove that
E
[
ui
(
θi, F (v
⊥)
)]− E[ui(θi, F (v))]
=
(
fi(v
⊥)− fi(v)
) · θi − (FPi (v⊥)− FPi (v))
=
(
fi(v
⊥)− fi(v)
) · θi −(v⊥i · fi(v⊥)− ∫ v⊥i
0
fi(z, v−i) dz − vi · fi(v) +
∫ vi
0
fi(z, v−i) dz
)
=
(
fi(v
⊥)− fi(v)
) · (θi − v⊥i ) + ∫ v⊥i
vi
(
fi(z, v−i)− fi(v)
)
dz .
12For example, the second-price mechanism with lexicographic tie-breaking is the mechanism Mf where f is defined
as follows: ∀i ∈ [n] and ∀v ∈ {0, . . . , B}n,
fi(v)
def
=
{
1, if (a) vi > max v−i or (b) vi = max v−i and i = min{j : vj = vi};
0, otherwise.
To see that this mechanism is 2-DM, consider two bids vi and v
′
i of player i that are at least a distance of two
apart; by choosing a strategy sub-profile for the other players where the highest bid falls between vi and v
′
i, we can
ensure that the desired integral is positive. A slightly more refined argument shows that the second-price mechanism
breaking ties at random is 1-DM.
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Now note that, since θi ∈ Ki, θi − v⊥i = θi − minKi ≥ 0; moreover, by the monotonicity of f ,
whenever z ≥ vi, it holds that fi(z, v−i) ≥ fi(v). We deduce that Eui
(
θi, F (v
⊥)
) ≥ Eui(θi, F (v)).
We conclude that v⊥i very-weakly dominates vi.
Proof of Property 2. Analogous to that of Property 1 and omitted.
Proof of Property 3. Due to the d-distinguishable monotonicity of M , vi ≤ v⊥i − d implies the
existence of a strategy sub-profile v−i making
∫ v⊥i
vi
(
fi(z, v−i)− fi(v)
)
dz strictly positive. For such
v−i, therefore, playing v⊥i is strictly better than vi.
Proof of Property 4. Analogous to that of Property 3 and omitted.
Thus the lemma holds. 
10 Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Let M2P = (S2P, F2P) be the second-price mechanism with any deterministic
tie-breaking rule. Then, for all contexts (n,B, δ,K, θ) and all strategy profiles v ∈ UDed(K):
SW
(
θ, F2P(v)
) ≥ (1− δ
1 + δ
)2
MSW(θ)− 2 1− δ
1 + δ
.
Proof. Since K is a δ-approximate candidate-valuation set, for each player i let xi be such that
Ki ⊆ δ[xi]. Then, in light of (the Distinguishable Monotonicity) Lemma 9.4 and the previous
observation that FA2P is a 2-DM allocation function, we have that, for each player i:
UDedi(x) ⊆
{d(1− δ)xie − 1, . . . , b(1 + δ)xic+ 1} . (10.1)
Let i∗ be the player with the highest true valuation and j∗ the player winning the good under
the bid profile v, that is, θi∗ = maxi θi and vj∗ = maxj vj .
If i∗ = j∗ then we are done. If i∗ 6= j∗, we need to show that θj∗ is not much lower than θi∗ .
From Eq. 10.1 we know that d(1 − δ)xi∗e − 1 ≤ vi∗ and vj∗ ≤ b(1 + δ)xj∗c + 1. Because j∗ is
the winner, we also know that vi∗ ≤ vj∗ . Combining these facts and “removing floors and ceilings”
we have (1− δ)xi∗ ≤ (1 + δ)xj∗ + 2; equivalently,
xj∗ ≥ (1− δ)
(1 + δ)
xi∗ − 2 1
(1 + δ)
.
Since we also know that θj∗ ≥ (1− δ)xj∗ and (1 + δ)xi∗ ≥ θi∗ , we obtain:
SW(θ, F2P(v)) = θj∗ ≥ (1− δ)xj∗ ≥ (1− δ)1− δ
1 + δ
xi∗ − 2(1− δ)
(1 + δ)
≥ (1− δ)1− δ
1 + δ
1
1 + δ
θi∗ − 2(1− δ)
(1 + δ)
=
(1− δ)2
(1 + δ)2
MSW(θ)− 2(1− δ)
(1 + δ)
.
Thus, the theorem holds. 
Remark 10.1. If M2P = (S2P, F2P) were the second-price mechanism breaking ties at random
(assigning a positive probability to each tie), then we can use a proof analogous to the one above,
with the only difference being that FA2P is 1-DM (instead of only 2-DM), and invoking the stronger
inclusion of (the Distinguishable Monotonicity) Lemma 9.4, to show the following, stronger lower
bound:
E
[
SW
(
θ, F2P(v)
)] ≥ (1− δ)2
(1 + δ)2
MSW(θ) .
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11 Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. ∀n, ∀δ ∈ (0, 1), and ∀B, there exists a mechanism M (δ)opt = (S, F ) such that for every
δ-approximate candidate-valuation profile K, every true-valuation profile θ ∈ K, and every strategy
profile v ∈ UDed(K):
E
[
SW
(
θ, F (v)
)] ≥ ((1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
)
MSW(θ) .
We break the construction of M
(δ)
opt and its analysis into several steps. At the highest level, in
order to leverage our Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma, and thus choose M
(δ)
opt = Mf (δ) for a
suitably chosen 1-DM allocation function f (δ).
11.1 Our Allocation Function
Given δ, we find it natural to choose an allocation function f (δ) that is symmetric: that is, f (δ)(v′) =
f (δ)(v) whenever the profile v′ consists of a permutation of the bids in v. In other words, “renaming
the players should not change the probability of allocating the good to a given player”.
Also, when some of the players’ bids are much smaller than others, we find it intuitive to interpret
the lower bids as being more likely to come from players with lower valuations. Accordingly, our
f (δ) gives positive probability only to the highest bids. However, when the highest bids are close
to each other, we find it hard to “infer” which one has been chosen by the player with the highest
true valuation: after all, we are in a Knightian model. Therefore our f (δ) assigns the good to a
randomly chosen high-bidding player. A bit more precisely, our f (δ) deterministically derives from
the players’ bids a threshold, and probabilistically chooses the winning player only among those
bids lying above the threshold. To achieve optimality, however, one must be much more careful in
allocating probability mass, and some complexities should be expected. Let us now proceed more
formally.
Let Dδ be the always positive quantity defined as follows: for all δ ∈ (0, 1),
Dδ
def
=
(
1 + δ
1− δ
)2
− 1 .
Definition 11.1. For all δ ∈ (0, 1), define f (δ) : [0, B]n → [0, 1]n as follows: for every i ∈ [n] and
every z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ [0, B]n
• if z1 ≥ z2 ≥ · · · ≥ zn, then
f
(δ)
i (z)
def
=
{
1
n · n+Dδn∗+Dδ ·
zi(n
∗+Dδ)−
∑n∗
j=1 zj
ziDδ
, if i ≤ n∗,
0, if i > n∗;
, (11.1)
where n∗ is the index in {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
z1 ≥ · · · ≥ zn∗ >
∑n∗
j=1 zj
n∗ +Dδ
≥ zn∗+1 ≥ · · · ≥ zn . (11.2)
• else, f (δ)i (z) def= f (δ)pi(i)(zpi(1), . . . , zpi(n)) where pi is any permutation of the players such that
zpi(1) ≥ · · · ≥ zpi(n).
We refer to
∑n∗
j=1 zj
n∗+Dδ as the bid threshold, to players 1, . . . , n
∗ as the candidate winners, and
to the players n∗ + 1, . . . , n as the losers.
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11.2 Our Allocation Function is Well Defined
Lemma 11.2. f (δ) is an allocation function.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that z1 ≥ z2 ≥ · · · ≥ zn.
We first prove that n∗ exists and is unique, and begin with its existence.
Note that there exists an integer n′ in [n] such that
∀ i > n′, zi ≤
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′ +Dδ
. (11.3)
Indeed, Eq. 11.3 vacuously holds for n′ = n. Now letting n′′ be the least such integer, the following
two facts hold:
∀ i > n′′, zi ≤
∑n′′
j=1 zj
n′′ +Dδ
and (11.4)
∃k ≥ n′′ such that zk >
∑n′′−1
j=1 zj
n′′ − 1 +Dδ . (11.5)
Because z is non-decreasing, the last inequality implies zn′′ >
∑n′′−1
j=1 zj
n′′−1+Dδ ; equivalently, zn′′ >
∑n′′
j=1 zj
n′′+Dδ .
Invoking again the monotonicity of z, we have
∀ i ≤ n′′, zi >
∑n′′
j=1 zj
n′′ +Dδ
. (11.6)
Thus, 11.3 and 11.6 imply that choosing n∗ = n′′ satisfies Eq. 11.2.
Next, we prove that n∗ is unique. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exist two integers
n⊥ and n>, n⊥ < n>, both satisfying Eq. 11.2. Now define
S⊥
def
=
n⊥∑
j=1
zj , S
> def=
n>∑
j=1
zj , S
∆ def= S> − S⊥, and n∆ def= n> − n⊥ .
Invoking Eq. 11.2 with n⊥ and n>, we deduce that for i ∈ {n⊥ + 1, . . . , n>},
S⊥
n⊥ +Dδ
≥ zi > S
>
n> +Dδ
=
S⊥ + S∆
n⊥ + n∆ +Dδ
.
Averaging over all zi such that i ∈ {n⊥ + 1, . . . , n>}, we get
S⊥
n⊥ +Dδ
≥ S
∆
n∆
>
S⊥ + S∆
n⊥ + n∆ +Dδ
. (11.7)
Let us now show that the second inequality of Eq. 11.7 contradicts the first:
S∆
n∆
>
S⊥ + S∆
n⊥ + n∆ +Dδ
⇔ (n⊥ + n∆ +Dδ)S∆ > n∆(S⊥ + S∆)
⇔ (n⊥ +Dδ)S∆ > n∆S⊥ ⇔ S
∆
n∆
>
S⊥
(n⊥ +Dδ)
.
The contradiction establishes the uniqueness of n∗.
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Finally, to prove that f (δ) is an allocation function we must argue that (a) f
(δ)
i (z) ≥ 0 for every
i and z, and (b)
∑
i f
(δ)
i (z) ≤ 1 for every z.
Since we are assuming z1 ≥ z2 ≥ · · · ≥ zn, inequality (a) holds because f (δ)i (z) = 0 for i > n∗
by definition, and because Eq. 11.2 tells us that zi(n
∗ +Dδ)−
∑n∗
j=1 zj > 0 for i ≤ n∗.
As for inequality (b), since it is easy to see that
∑n∗
j=1
zj
zi
≥ n∗, we have
n∑
i=1
f
(δ)
i (z) =
1
n
· n+Dδ
n∗ +Dδ
·
n∗∑
i=1
zi(n
∗ +Dδ)−
∑n∗
j=1 zj
ziDδ
=
1
n
· n+Dδ
(n∗ +Dδ)Dδ
·
n∗(n∗ +Dδ)− n∗∑
i=1
n∗∑
j=1
zj
zi

≤ 1
n
· n+Dδ
(n∗ +Dδ)Dδ
· (n∗(n∗ +Dδ)− n∗n∗)
=
nn∗ + n∗Dδ
nn∗ + nDδ
≤ 1 .

11.3 Our Allocation Function is 1-Distinguishably Monotonic
Lemma 11.3. f (δ) is monotonic.
Proof. Since f (δ) is symmetric, it suffices to show its monotonicity with respect to a single coordi-
nate, and we choose the n-th one for notational convenience.
Let z−n = (z1, . . . , zn−1) ∈ [0, B]n−1 and assume, with no generality loss, that z1 ≥ z2 ≥ · · · ≥
zn−1.
We must prove that if 0 ≤ z⊥n < z>n ≤ B, then
f (δ)n (z−n, z
⊥
n ) ≤ f (δ)n (z−n, z>n ) . (11.8)
To prove Eq. 11.8 we establish two convenient claims. Before doing so, we wish to stress that,
although z−n is assumed to be monotonically non increasing, when zn is chosen arbitrarily the
profile (z−n, zn) may not be monotonic.
CLAIM 1. If n′ is the number of candidate winners when only the first n − 1 players are bidding
and their bid profile is z−n, then for all zn
zn ≤
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′ +Dδ
⇒ f (δ)n (z−n, zn) = 0 (i.e., n is a loser) (11.9)
zn >
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′ +Dδ
⇒ f (δ)n (z−n, zn) > 0 (i.e., n is a winner) (11.10)
Proof of CLAIM 1. The hypothesis of CLAIM 1 can be re-written as follows:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′}, zi >
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′ +Dδ
; and ∀i ∈ {n′ + 1, . . . , n− 1}, zi ≤
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′ +Dδ
.
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Let (“player n join the game bidding”) zn ≤
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′+Dδ . Then
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′}, zi >
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′ +Dδ
; and ∀i ∈ {n′ + 1, . . . , n}, zi ≤
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′ +Dδ
.
That is, the bid threshold continues to be
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′+Dδ , and the set of winners continues to be {1, 2, . . . , n′}.
Thus n is a loser and inequality 11.9 holds.
Let now (player n join the game bidding) zn >
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′+Dδ and assume, for the sake of contradiction,
that f
(δ)
n (z−n, zn) = 0, that is, that player n is a loser. Then, letting n∗ be the new number of
candidate winners, by definition:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n∗}, zi >
∑n∗
j=1 zj
n∗ +Dδ
; ∀i ∈ {n∗ + 1, . . . , n}, zi ≤
∑n∗
j=1 zj
n∗ +Dδ
.
Thus, “ignoring n” we get
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n∗}, zi >
∑n∗
j=1 zj
n∗ +Dδ
; ∀i ∈ {n∗ + 1, . . . , n− 1}, zi ≤
∑n∗
j=1 zj
n∗ +Dδ
.
That is, n∗ is also the number of candidate winners under the hypothesis of CLAIM 1. Thus,
the uniqueness of n∗ implies n∗ = n′. In turn, this implies that zn ≤
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′+Dδ , a contradiction. This
contradiction proves that n is a winner. Thus the claimed inequality (11.10) holds.
Thanks to CLAIM 1, to establish the monotonicity of f (δ) it suffices to prove that
if
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′ +Dδ
< z⊥n < z
>
n , then f
(δ)
n (z−n, z
⊥
n ) ≤ f (δ)n (z−n, z>n ) . (11.11)
Notice that for such z⊥n and z
>
n , player n is always a candidate winner. Therefore, let {1, . . . , n⊥, n}
and {1, . . . , n>, n} be the winners when the bid profiles are (z−n, z⊥n ) and (z−n, z>n ) respectively.
We now relate n⊥ and n>.
CLAIM 2. n⊥ ≥ n>.
Proof of CLAIM 2. Assume by way of contradiction that n⊥ < n>.
We proceed in a way similar to the proof of Lemma 11.2. Set
n∆
def
= n> − n⊥, S⊥ def= ∑n⊥j=1 zj , and S> def= ∑n>j=1 zj = S⊥ + S∆.
Since n⊥ ≤ i < n> implies that player i is a loser when the bid profile is (z−n, z⊥n ) and a winner
when the bid profile is (z−n, z>n ), we have
S⊥ + z⊥n
n⊥ + 1 +Dδ
≥ zi > S
> + z>n
n> + 1 +Dδ
=
S⊥ + S∆ + z>n
n⊥ + n∆ + 1 +Dδ
.
Averaging over all i such that n⊥ ≤ i < n> we get:
S⊥ + z⊥n
n⊥ + 1 +Dδ
≥ S
∆
n∆
>
S⊥ + S∆ + z>n
n⊥ + n∆ + 1 +Dδ
. (11.12)
Focusing on the second inequality of (11.12), we have
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S∆
n∆
>
S⊥ + S∆ + z>n
n⊥ + n∆ + 1 +Dδ
⇔ (n⊥ + n∆ + 1 +Dδ)S∆ > n∆(S⊥ + S∆ + z>n )
⇔ (n⊥ + 1 +Dδ)S∆ > n∆(S⊥ + z>n )
⇔ S
∆
n∆
>
S⊥ + z>n
n⊥ + 1 +Dδ
.
Thus, since z⊥n < z
>
n , the second inequality (11.12) contradicts the first.
The contradiction establishes that n⊥ ≥ n> as claimed.
We now use the fact that n⊥ ≥ n> to prove Eq. 11.11, as desired.
If n⊥ = n>, then, for both (z−n, z>n ) and (z−n, z⊥n ), the set of candidate winners is {1, 2, . . . , n⊥, n}.
Thus, letting n∗ = n⊥ + 1 = n> + 1 be the number of candidate winners, we get
f (δ)n (z−n, z
⊥
n ) =
1
n
· n+Dδ
n∗ +Dδ
· z
⊥
n (n
∗ +Dδ)−
∑n∗−1
j=1 zj − z⊥n
z⊥nDδ
≤ 1
n
· n+Dδ
n∗ +Dδ
· z
>
n (n
∗ +Dδ)−
∑n∗−1
j=1 zj − z>n
z>nDδ
= f (δ)n (z−n, z
>
n ) .
If n⊥ > n>, then let n⊥ = n> + n∆, S> =
∑n>
j=1 zj and S
⊥ =
∑n⊥
j=1 zj = S
> + S∆ as before.
Averaging over all zi such that n
> < i ≤ n⊥ we get:
S∆
n∆
>
S⊥ + z⊥n
n⊥ + 1 +Dδ
=
S> + S∆ + z⊥n
n> + n∆ + 1 +Dδ
. (11.13)
But this is equivalent to
S∆
n∆
>
S> + z⊥n
n> + 1 +Dδ
. (11.14)
Letting C1 =
n+Dδ
n and C2 = C1
1
(n⊥+1+Dδ)z⊥n
1
(n>+1+Dδ)z>n
, we now do the final calculation:
f (δ)n (z−n, z
>
n )− f (δ)n (z−n, z⊥n )
= C1 ·
(z>n (n> + 1 +Dδ)− S> − z>n
(n> + 1 +Dδ)z>n
− z
⊥
n (n
⊥ + 1 +Dδ)− S⊥ − z⊥n
(n⊥ + 1 +Dδ)z⊥n
)
= C1 ·
( S⊥ + z⊥n
(n⊥ + 1 +Dδ)z⊥n
− S
> + z>n
(n> + 1 +Dδ)z>n
)
= C2 ·
(
(S⊥ + z⊥n )(n
> + 1 +Dδ)z
>
n − (S> + z>n )(n⊥ + 1 +Dδ)z⊥n
)
= C2 ·
(
(S> + S∆ + z⊥n )(n
> + 1 +Dδ)z
>
n − (S> + z>n )(n> + n∆ + 1 +Dδ)z⊥n
)
= C2 ·
(
S>(n> + 1 +Dδ)(z
>
n − z⊥n ) + S∆(n> + 1 +Dδ)z>n − n∆(S> + z>n )z⊥n
)
≥ C2 ·
(
S>(n> + 1 +Dδ)(z
>
n − z⊥n ) + S∆(n> + 1 +Dδ)z>n − n∆(S> + z⊥n )z>n
)
≥ 0
The last inequality has been derived using the fact that z>n − z⊥n ≥ 0 and (by Eq. 11.14) the fact
that S∆(n> + 1 +Dδ)− n∆(S> + z⊥n ) > 0.
This finishes the proof that f (δ) is monotonic. 
Lemma 11.4. f (δ) is 1-distinguishably monotonic.
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Proof. We already know from Lemma 11.3 that f (δ) is monotonic.
We now need to argue the integrability of f (δ), that is, that f
(δ)
i (zi, z−i) is integrable in zi for
any choice of z−i. Again, because f (δ) is symmetric, it suffices to argue this for i = n. To do so,
let us first point out that the number of winners does not increase when zn increases, for any z−n.
Indeed, letting n′ be the number of candidate winners when only the first n− 1 players are bidding
and their bid profile is z−n, CLAIM 1 in the proof Lemma 11.3 tells us that when zn ≤
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′+Dδ
player n is always a loser and thus the number of winners remains constant; moreover, CLAIM
2 in the proof of Lemma 11.3 tells us that when zn increases past
∑n′
j=1 zj
n′+Dδ the number of winners
does not decrease. Thus, f (δ) is piecewise continuous (as we have established that the number of
winners does not increase when zn increases, the finite number of continuous pieces is at most n),
and therefore f (δ) is integrable.
We are therefore left to prove the “distinguishability condition”.
Fix a player i ∈ [n] and two distinct valuations vi, v′i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}, and assume that vi < v′i.
If we choose v−i = (vi, vi, . . . , vi), then:
• f (δ)i (vi, v−i) = 1n since there are n winners, all bidding the same valuation, and
• f (δ)i (z, v−i) = 1nDδ (Dδ + n− 1−
vi
z (n− 1)) > 1n , when vi < z ≤ (1 +Dδ)vi.
The upper bound (1 +Dδ)vi is to make sure that the number of winners is still n on input (z, v−i).
Thus, by definition, f
(δ)
i (z, v−i) is a function that is strictly increasing when z increases in (vi, (1 +
Dδ)vi], and therefore∫ v′i
vi
(
f
(δ)
i (z, v−i)− f (δ)i (vi, v−i)
)
dz ≥
∫ min{v′i,(1+Dδ)vi}
vi
(
f
(δ)
i (z, v−i)− f (δ)i (vi, v−i)
)
dz > 0 ,
as desired. 
11.4 Our Allocation Function is δ-Good
Our last lemma tells us that M
(δ)
opt
def
= Mf (δ) is a 1-distinguishably monotone mechanism. This
property (via our Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma) simplifies the analysis of the undominated
strategies for M
(δ)
opt, but otherwise has no bearing on proving the social-welfare performance claimed
for M
(δ)
opt in Theorem 4. (As already remarked, the probabilistic second-price mechanism is 1-
DM, but only guarantees a fraction
(
1−δ
1+δ
)2
of the maximum social welfare.) Accordingly, our
allocation function f (δ) must and indeed does satisfy an additional property, δ-goodness. We state
this property below and prove that f (δ) indeed satisfies it. Only in the next section we shall prove
the relevance of δ-goodness for Theorem 4.
Recall that Dδ
def
=
(
1+δ
1−δ
)2 − 1.
Definition 11.5. We say that a 1-DM allocation function f is δ-good if
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀ v ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}n,
n∑
j=1
fj(v)vj +Dδ · fi(v)vi ≥ 1
n
· vi(n+Dδ) .
Lemma 11.6. f (δ) is δ-good.
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Proof. As we already know that f (δ) is 1-DM, we establish the lemma by proving that the above
inequality holds not only for the discrete cube {0, 1, . . . , B}n, but actaually for the continuous cube
[0, B]n.
Without loss of generality, assume z1 ≥ z2 ≥ · · · ≥ zn. Observe that:
n∑
i=1
f
(δ)
i (z)zi =
n∗∑
i=1
f
(δ)
i (z)zi =
1
n
· n+Dδ
n∗ +Dδ
·
n∗∑
i=1
zi(n
∗ +Dδ)−
∑n∗
j=1 zj
Dδ
=
1
n
· n+Dδ
n∗ +Dδ
·
(
n∗∑
i=1
zi
)
.
Then, for each looser k (i.e., each player k > n∗, we have
n∑
j=1
f
(δ)
j (z)zj +Dδ · f (δ)k (z)zk =
n∑
i=1
f
(δ)
i (z)zi =
n+Dδ
n
·
∑n∗
i=1 zi
n∗ +Dδ
≥ n+Dδ
n
· zk
where the last inequality is due to Eq. 11.2.
At the same time, for each winner i (i.e., each player i ≤ n∗), we have
n∑
j=1
f
(δ)
j (z)zj +Dδ · f (δ)i (z)zi =
1
n
· n+Dδ
n∗ +Dδ
·
(
n∗∑
i=1
zi
)
+Dδ · f (δ)i (z)zi
=
1
n
· n+Dδ
n∗ +Dδ
zi(n
∗ +Dδ) =
1
n
· zi(n+Dδ)
again satisfying Eq. 11.5.
11.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Since M
(δ)
opt = Mf (δ) , Theorem 4 immediately follows from the fact that our allocation function f
(δ)
is δ-good and the following
Lemma 11.7. If f is δ-good, then for the mechanism Mf = (S, F ) we have: for all contexts
(n,B, δ,K, θ) and all strategy profile v ∈ UDed(K),
E
[
SW
(
θ, F (v)
)] ≥ ((1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
)
MSW(θ) .
Proof. Arbitrarily fix a context (n,B, δ,K, θ) and v ∈ UDed(K). Then, because in any allocation
the social welfare coincides with the true valuation of some player, to prove our lemma it suffices
to prove that
∀i ∈ [n],
n∑
j=1
θjfj(v) ≥
(
(1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
)
θi . (11.15)
For every i ∈ [n], let xi ∈ R be such that Ki ⊆ δ[xi], and let δ[x] = δ[x1] × · · · × δ[xn]. Then,
the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma respectively implies (1− δ)xi ≤ minKi ≤ vi ≤ maxKi ≤
(1 + δ)xi; equivalently,
vi
1 + δ
≤ xi ≤ vi
1− δ .
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Also, θ ∈ K implies (1− δ)xi ≤ θi ≤ (1 + δ)xi. Combining the last two chains of inequalities yields
1− δ
1 + δ
vi ≤ θi ≤ 1 + δ
1− δ vi . (11.16)
Let us now argue that Eq. 11.15 holds by arbitrarily fixing v and i and showing that it is
impossible to construct a “bad” θ so as to violate Eq. 11.15.
In trying to construct a “bad” θ, it suffices to choose θj (for j 6= i) to be as small as possible,
since θj only appears on the left-hand side with a positive coefficient. For θi, however, we may
want to choose it as large as possible if fi(v) ≥
( (1−δ)2+ 4δ
n
(1+δ)2
)
, or as small as possible otherwise. So
there are two extreme θ’s.
Considering these extreme choices, we conclude that no θ contradicts Eq. 11.15 if:
n∑
j=1
(1− δ
1 + δ
)
vjfj(v) ≥
(
(1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
)(1− δ
1 + δ
)
vi , and
n∑
j=1
(1− δ
1 + δ
)
vjfj(v) +
(1 + δ
1− δ −
1− δ
1 + δ
)
vifi(v) ≥
(
(1− δ)2 + 4δn
(1 + δ)2
)(1 + δ
1− δ
)
vi .
Simplifying the above equations, Eq. 11.15 holds if both the following inequalities hold:
n∑
j=1
vjfj(v) ≥ n+Dδ
n
· 1
Dδ + 1
· vi , (11.17)
n∑
j=1
vjfj(v) +Dδ · vifi(v) ≥ n+Dδ
n
vi . (11.18)
Note that Eq. 11.18 holds because it is implied by the hypothesis that f is δ-good; note also that
Eq. 11.17 holds because it is implied by Eq. 11.18. Indeed, since 1Dδ+1 =
(
1−δ
1+δ
)2
< 1 for all
δ ∈ (0, 1),
n∑
j=1
vjfj(v) ≥ 1
Dδ + 1
 n∑
j=1
vjfj(v) +Dδvifi(v)
 ≥ 1
Dδ + 1
n+Dδ
n
vi .
Thus both Eq. 11.15 and both our lemma and Theorem 4 hold.
11.6 The Computational Efficiency of M
(δ)
opt
Finally, we wish to clarify that, although M
(δ)
opt = Mf (δ) = (S, F ) is not as simple as the second-price
mechanism, it can still be efficiently implemented. That is, both the allocation function FA = f (δ)
and the expected price function FP are efficiently computable over {0, 1, . . . , B}n.
The computational efficiency of FA is apparent once one realizes that the number of candidate
winners, n∗, can be determined in linear time.
The computational efficiency of FP requires a bit of an argument. Without loss of generality,
let us show how to compute the expected price for player n. Recall that, for a bid profile v,
FPn (v−n, vn) = f
(δ)
n (v−n, vn) · vn −
∫ vn
0
f (δ)n (v−n, z) dz .
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When v−n is fixed, f
(δ)
n is a function piece-wisely defined according to vn, since different values
of vn may result in different numbers of winners n
∗. Assume without loss of generality that
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn−1, and let n′ be the number of winners when player n is absent.
When vn ≤
∑n′
j=1 vj
n′+Dδ , the proof of the monotonicity of f
(δ) implies that f
(δ)
n = 0, so that integral
below this point is zero.
When vn >
∑n′
j=1 vj
n′+Dδ , one can again see from the proof of the monotonicity of f
(δ) that n∗ is
non-increasing as a function of vn. Therefore, f
(δ)
n contains at most n different pieces and, for each
piece with n∗ fixed, f (δ)n (v−n, vn) = a+b/vn is a function that is symbolically integrable. Therefore,
the only question is how to calculate the pieces for f
(δ)
n .
Conceptually, one starts from vn =
∑n′
j=1 vj
n′+Dδ and “moves vn upwards”, recording the points
at which Eq. 11.2 is violated, because these are the “borders of the continuous pieces” of f
(δ)
n .
Practically, this seemingly infinite procedure may be efficiently carried out by a line sweep method.
12 Conclusions
Mechanism design is undoubtedly a fascinating field. One can only marvel at the possibility that
an ignorant social planner can leverage the knowledge and the rationality of the players in order
to obtain the outcomes he desires. But if we want to transform this beautiful theory into strong
guarantees in the real world it is important to minimize its underlying assumptions.
To us, the assumption that each player knows “on the nose” his own valuation appears to be
too idealized in many an environment. Even the assumption that each player knows a probability
distribution from which his own true valuation has been drawn is very strong. To be safe, we should
budget for the possibility of Knightian players.
In any field, as we progress from idealized to more and more realistic models, we should expect
to face additional complexities. Knightian mechanism design will be no exception. Nonetheless,
we should remain optimistic. At least for single-good auctions, Knightian mechanism design is
workable.
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(b) With n = 4 players, the second-price mechanism
performs worse than randomly assigning the good for
δ > 0.34.
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(d) With δ = 0.3, the second-price mechanism per-
forms worse than randomly assigning the good for
n = 2, 3.
Figure 1: The social welfare guarantees of randomly assigning the good (ε = 1n), the second-price
mechanism (ε = (1−δ)
2
(1+δ)2
), and our optimal mechanism (ε = (1−δ)
2+ 4δn
(1+δ)2
). In (1a) and (1b) we compare
ε versus δ, and in (1c) and (1d) we compare ε versus n. The green data, our mechanism, is always
better (at times significantly) than the other two mechanisms.
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